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STRATEGY RESEARCH **PROJECT**

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION: INDIA & PAKISTAN

BY

COMMANDER JAMES S. FALLON United States Navy

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DR Gary L. Guertner Project Advisor

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ABSTRACT

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As most of the world continues to seek ways to reduce or eliminate the spread of nuclear weapons, two countries seem intent on pursuing a path which is contradictory. India and Pakistan, two neighboring and frequently warring nations, condemn the use of nuclear weapons as they continue to develop the capability to deliver a nuclear payload. Additionally, India has stood against the Non-Proliferation Treaty, insisting that all nations must agree to eliminate nuclear weapons. It is against this seemingly hopeless situation that this report is focused. How can nuclear proliferation in South Asia be diffused while answering the security concerns of both India and Pakistan. What I offer here is a review of the history, the current situation for the area, and a proposed solution to this nuclear stalemate.

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Historical Perspective.

India and Pakistan have long-standing ethnic, religious, and territorial disputes which have prevailed since their partition in 1947. The primary source of friction between the two nations has been the Kashmir state of India. Kashmir, which has a Muslim majority, became part of India in 1947. This region has been the center of turmoil since the British withdrew from the continent, the point of departure being whether Kashmir was coerced into becoming an Indain state or not.

India, as a secular state, holds on to Kashmir due in part to the fear of what precedent would be set if this "religious" separatist movement succeeded. Additionally, if the current regime were to allow the Muslim dominated Kashmir to secede, it might be perceived as a move by the Indian government to become more non-secular. On the other hand, Pakistan support for Kashmir has been based on their common Muslim religion and geographic proximity.

After the recent ousting of Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, the Foreign Ministry stated that Pakistan would continue to support the Kashmir rebellion, however, not militarily. Pakistan has also sought world opinion and third party intervention to stop human rights abuses by the Indians in Kashmir. Although these allegations were initially denied by India, members of the Indian Army, both officers and enlisted, have been charged and punished for human rights violations in Kashmir. And, as promised by the Indian Prime Minister this past summer, elections were held in Kashmir for the first time since 1991. The June elections appeared to have diffused the problem, if only momentarily, when the newly elected government in Kashmir pledged to end the conflict. Although the hostilities continue, in February of this year, the Indian Government announced a week long cease fire for the Muslim observance of Ramadan.

I have emphasized Kashmir as the main source of conflict in South Asia. Both India and Pakistan, however, are battling major social, political, and economic issues which undermine their ability to effectively resolve both the Kashmir and nuclear proliferation issues. India, although a secular democratic government, has shown signs of having its political agenda dominated more and more by the revivalist Hindu Party (BJP). This is a real threat to the political structure of India, and it creates the potential for religious and ethnic partition; a circumstance which India has fought long and hard to avoid. On the economic front, India is opening her borders to the world in hopes of encouraging foreign investments and ultimately a more open market. A new economic elite is emerging that is outward-looking and more concerned with profit and competitiveness than with India's ability to wield political and military influence. This move to a more open market, a greater link with the world economy, may ultimately make India more vulnerable to international pressure.

In Pakistan the government is in turmoil as evidenced by the November legal ouster of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto from her position by the President. The reasons provided ranged from corruption to being ineffective. Subsequently, elections were held this past February in which the Muslim League, led by previous Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, won control of the 217 seat National Assembly. On the economic front, Pakistan has historically maintained a more capitalistic economy, however, they also have a massive debt to the International Monetary Fund.

Introduction.

It is against this backdrop that we have two nations with domestic turmoil, territorial claims and acknowledged nuclear capabilities. What further complicates this scenario is that the quantity and capability of these weapons are only postulated, as are the circumstances in which they might be used. This entire issue is very puzzling since both India and Pakistan publicly denounce the use of nuclear weapons and have a stated aversion to their use, yet, still proclaim their sovereign "right" to own them. Devin Hagerty observes,

"Over the long-term, two South Asia's are possible. The first is a region with minimal nuclear weapons capabilities that deter war but pose a risk of nuclear accidents and the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. The second is a nuclear weapons-free subcontinent with an increased likelihood of conventional war but no chance of a nuclear weapons-related disaster. Only Indian and Pakistani leaders can decide which South Asia they would like to inhabit."

This complex issue is the result of the Indian pursuit of a nuclear capability and its need to be recognized as a "world power." Pakistan has followed the same pursuit of nuclear weapon technology in response to the potential threat from India. This is further supported by Pakistan's contention that they would sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) if India would. We must, therefore, provide both nations the incentives and disincentives that would make it in their national interests to sign the NPT and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

It must also be noted that the U.S. was supplying conventional arms to Pakistan during the Afghanistan crisis with the caveat that they not pursue nuclear weapon technology. This assistance was terminated in 1990 when the congressionally mandated sanctions under the Pressler Amendment went into effect. It required the President to certify that Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons. The amendment banned all military and economic aid until Pakistan did away with its nuclear weapon capability. This was further complicated when the United States withheld the delivery of 28 F-16s which Pakistan had bought and paid for prior to the amendment being passed⁴. This in-turn forced Pakistan (in their view) to seek increased nuclear capabilities due to the overwhelming superiority in size of the conventional and nuclear capabilities of India. A policy dilemma for the United States and a self-fulfilling prophecy for Pakistan set in motion!

The regional security dilemma in South Asia becomes even more complex when the relationship between India and China is considered. Although India views Pakistan as a threat, it is China that is viewed as the more serious long term threat. India and China fought a war in 1962, they continue to have territorial disputes, and China has provided military assistance to Pakistan. The Chinese have superior conventional and nuclear forces, and it is doubtful that India could ever reach an equitable military position with China without bankrupting itself. By 2010, the projected annual military spending in China (\$218 billion, in 1986 U.S. dollars) is expected to be more than four times India's, while the Chinese military capital stock is projected to be proportionately even higher - a ratio of six to one.⁵

Clearly both India and Pakistan are important in their ability to promote the stability of South Asia. Pakistan is a moderate Islamic state that serves as a counterweight to the radical

Islamic states in the region, and India is the world's most populace democracy.⁶ All three nations have pursued confidence building measures to a moderate degree. These measures, along with their pursuit of more aggressive market oriented economies, may eventually unite these nations economically and financially. This would be a giant step towards eliminating the threat, real or perceived, which now clouds the nonproliferation progress in South Asia.

U.S. Policy

Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement" and the current National Military Strategy recognize the need for deterrence and conflict prevention, and specifically, nuclear deterrence. The U.S. National Security Strategy states that our intent is to ultimately eliminate nuclear missile capabilities in India and Pakistan, however, no specific strategy is offered. This may be a glaring deficiency or merely an acknowledgment of the tenuous situation between India and Pakistan that makes the formulation of a cogent strategy difficult. In contrast, The Office of the Secretary of Defense in its "Proliferation: Threat and Response" acknowledges the security interests of South Asia, "including preventing another Indo-Pakistani war and enhancing regional stability." The current goal is to persuade India and Pakistan to cap, reduce, and eventually eliminate their nuclear weapons capabilities. "This approach supports our global objective to reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons." This issue is even more difficult in South Asia because neither country has officially declared itself a nuclear power.

It must be noted that the stated objective in the SECDEF document is to "eliminate nuclear weapons" in other nations. However, the national strategy clearly states that the "United States will retain the capacity to retaliate against those who might contemplate the use of weapons of mass destruction." This type of mindset that it's OK for only the U.S. to maintain a nuclear arsenal is what disturbs many non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) and is an obstacle to nonproliferation. If the U.S. expects other countries not to seek, or to dismantle their current nuclear capabilities, while we retain our own, we must ensure that we address the specific concerns of each nation with diplomacy and understanding.

It is evident that the policies reflected above do not articulate the full range of complexities associated with nuclear weapon issues in South Asia. In fact, some "experts" will point to ambiguity of the situation and hold it up as a stable deterrent. Perhaps, in the short term, but in the long term, the reality is that the welfare of the entire area is jeopordized by its ambiguous nuclear policies. Also, the strategic location of India and Pakistan, as well the continued security of both nations, must be considered important national security concerns for the U.S. It is, therefore, in our best interest to institute specific strategies, both short term and long term, to deal with what has been called the "worlds most dangerous standoff." ¹⁰

There can be no doubt that both India and Pakistan currently posses the ability and technical expertise to produce and deliver a nuclear payload. The quantities are not known precisely, and the speculation varies, however, India may have enough fissile material to build 100 bombs per year, and Pakistan has the material for 12 bombs. Currently, neither have the missile capability to deliver a nuclear payload any great distance (currently 180 miles for Pakistan, and India is developing the Agni with an estimated range of 1,500 miles), however, if India is able

to produce a space launch system it appears inevitable that they will eventually be capable of producing long range ballistic missiles.

India and Pakistan have a shared history of repeated conflicts, both major and minor, and the unresolved issue over Kashmir continues to create tension. This environment of conflict is further complicated by the unknown nature of the nuclear abilities of both nations. There are those that claim it is the ambiguous nature of their respective nuclear capabilities that has prevented the escalation of minor conflicts from becoming something more lethal. Failing to address this ambiguous policy, however, is dangerous and irresponsible. The possibility of war between India and Pakistan is very real, and a miscalculation of each others nuclear ability and the circumstances in which they would be used, could culminate in a nuclear exchange.

A second concern is the security of these weapons and their potential to fall into irresponsible hands, by legitimate means or otherwise. This situation could be mitigated by the U.S. assessing and then assisting in the security of the nuclear weapons held by India and Pakistan. The security issue is a sticking point, however, because India and Pakistan have both refused to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, denying their existence while rhetorically postulating the circumstances for their use. The U.S. has, therefore, rejected any notion of assisting in the security of their nuclear weapons. Why are these issues mutually exclusive? The fact that the NPT is not signed needs to be addressed, however, it is also in our best interest, and of the entire globe, to ensure that whatever nuclear capabilities are present in South Asia are secure!

Clearly, India and Pakistan are not rogue nations. They have been cautious and discreet in their possession of nuclear weapons. The challenges to their national survival and sovereignty are

just as important to them as they are to Israel. Additionally, the close proximity of India and Pakistan to China, Iran, and Iraq, should certainly provide a clear incentive for the U.S. to maintain a close and mutually appealing relationship to ensure their mutual survival as nations, and to support our national security interest in the region.

Strategy for the Region.

The current U.S. policies regarding the nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan have failed to achieve their desired outcome and have potentially alienated two stable countries in an otherwise explosive region. The U.S. continues a disturbing post-cold war pattern in which American policy toward South Asia appears to be tactics more than strategy. By not acknowledging or accepting the nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan, and denying them the tools and safeguards normally extended to nuclear capable nations, is potentially disastrous. The goal of the U.S. should be to help stabilize the subcontinent's current nuclear posture with an immediate counterproliferation strategy that is rooted in prevention policies. However, any strategy must include to some extent China, a very real component of the South Asia proliferation dilemma. The formulation of any anti-proliferation strategy for South Asia is handicapped by underplaying the China factor. China is an integral piece to the South Asian proliferation triad and, therefore, needs to be part of any regional proposal to resolve the proliferation program. This strategy must be outlined by initiating short term goals and incentives, followed by clear and succinct long term goals.

The momentum of the nuclear race in South Asia has been spurred by nationalism. Any attempt by India or Pakistani leadership to move away from this movement will be viewed as a sign of weakness and political suicide. Because of this we must approach this issue in such a way as to present clear and concise advantages to a non-proliferation policy. A policy that will also fully illustrate the disadvantages of pursuing a proliferation policy. At this point, however, penalties for non-compliance are not the answer. Penalties imposed on a nation whose course of action is based on protecting its sovereignty is bound for failure. Additionally, to deny these nations the tools to safeguard their nuclear capabilities as a method of coercion is irresponsible.

Despite the possibility that present trends might be irreversible, it may still be feasible to prevent an arms race on the subcontinent and forestall the emergence of India and Pakistan as full-fledged nuclear powers.¹⁴ The only way to achieve this reversal is to assist these nations in coming to their own decision to reverse their current posture regarding nuclear proliferation.

Short Term Goals.

There are many short term goals and concepts which can be established to help reverse the dangerous proliferation trend in South Asia. Crucial to the success of any plan is including India, Pakistan, and China in the planning process. Any goals that are dictated will be viewed as interventionist and weaken the political ability of their governments to accomplish these goals. Mutual distrust may circumvent this process, in which case the first step would be all inclusive talks to lay the framework for what is hoped to be achieved. Additionally, there must be some incentive for these nations to change their current outlook on their own nuclear posture.

- 1. Confidence Building Measures (CBMs): To achieve any lasting peace in South Asia the use of CBMs may be the most important step. If we seek to reduce "tension" what better way than by increasing the type and number of CBMs? India and Pakistan have both military and non-military CBMs in place already. These include: neutrality of nuclear facilities from any conflict, restrictions on chemical weapons, establishment of a "hot line," and advance notification of military maneuvers. These CBMs are a start, however, they should be expanded to include:
- (a.) Enlarging the scope of the subsisting agreement not to attack each other's designated nuclear facilities and installations to include identified population and high value economic targets;
- (b.) Further establishment of "hot line" communications between the two Air Forces/Navies, and ensuring that multiple redundancy linkages are available at all times to provide fail-safe channels of communications which is of supreme importance during crisis;
- (c.) The agreement on providing advance notice of military exercises and movements can be broadened to include information regarding deployment of offensive weapon systems with specified border zones to reduce the possibility of surprise or preemptive attacks. Such weapon systems could include tanks, armored personnel carriers, combat aircraft and, especially, surface-to-surface missiles. As a further measure of CBMs the association of military observers with major field exercises could be considered, which gains salience since the Brasstacks and 1990 crises in Indo-Pak relations had revolved around large-scale military exercises and the mutual misperceptions that accrued about their intention;
- (d.) The air space violations prevention agreement could be extended into an 'open skies' arrangement, and permitting aerial reconnaissance of specified border zones by joint teams to satisfy both sides that no prohibited force movements/deployments were taking place.¹⁵

The objective of these CBMs are mostly military in nature, however, there are non-military CBMs in existence today, including the Indus Waters Treaty, which provides for water sharing and a commission for crisis resolution. However, additional CBMs should be explored, including:

- (a.) Steps taken to resume communication, postal, telegraphic, sea, and land links.
- (b.) Appropriate steps shall be taken to promote travel facilities for foreign nationals.
- (c.) Trade and cooperation in economic and other agreed fields resumed as soon as possible.
 - (d.) Promoting exchanges in the fields of science and culture. 16

These CBMs do not address the Kashmir issue, however, and it is hopeful that some measure of trust and goodwill will result from these CBMs that will facilitate other negotiations in the future. The greater the interdependence between these two nations the greater the need to avoid conflict will become. Although there are similar CBMs between India and China it would be in their best interest if all three nations could participate in the development and implementation of the CBMs suggested.

2. Acknowledgment of Nuclear Capabilities: Clearly any meaningful discussion must include a clear and concise acknowledgment of the nuclear capability of each country. There is a dangerous air of suspicion that surrounds these capabilities. Some "experts" point to this ambiguity as a strength in the relationship between India and Pakistan. If there is a future of

prosperity and economic vitality for South Asia the proliferation issue must be addressed clearly and succinctly. Now is the time for India to step forward and lead by example. That is is the trait of a great nation. Not a nuclear capability!

3. Nuclear Freeze: In September of 1996 the "Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty" (CTBT) was passed by the United Nations General Assembly by a vote of 158 to 5. Only India, Bhutan, and Libya voted against the treaty. This is a very clear sign that the international community is committed to end nuclear testing and eventually the elimination of nuclear arms. The current treaty requires the ratification of 41 countries, including India, for it to go into effect. Pakistan has always maintained that she would sign if India did, however, Pakistan showed its commitment to end the nuclear race by signing the CTBT without any commitment from India.

India opposes the Treaty on the grounds that it does not prevent continued development of nuclear weapons by the nuclear weapon states (NWS) and because the Treaty's entry into force provision requires the ratification of the three threshold nuclear states as well as the nuclear-weapon states before the Treaty can take effect. No anti-proliferation strategy for South Asia will succeed unless the NWS agree to some measure of freezing their own growth and agreeing to place the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons as a major agenda item for their national strategy. Such a strategy might require the issue to be addressed by the year 2002, followed by a commitment for follow-on implementation by the year 2010.

4. No Aggression with Nuclear Weapons: An agreement not to use nuclear weapons would go hand-in-hand with the CBMs previously mentioned. For this to occur the other goals must

also be initiated because this goal will not stand by itself. There can be no lasting agreement unless China also participates in this resolution. "Positive Chinese non-proliferation step, e.g. Chinese support for a CTBT and a fissile material production cut-off, will greatly enhance prospects for similar step in South Asia."

A vow to avert aggression with nuclear weapons could be further facilitated by making South Asia a nuclear exclusion zone...a "nuclear free" zone. An end to the big-power military competition in the Indian Ocean and the ocean's denuclearization will be important moves to promote nonproliferation on the subcontinent.¹⁹ Most nations no longer deploy tactical nuclear weapons which should facilitate the establishment of a "nuclear free" zone. This could be further supported by a pledge by the superpowers not to deploy nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean.

This goal could be further facilitated by a "no first-use agreement." India has called for an international no-first-use agreement, and might consider a regional agreement if it includes China. Additionally, Western powers, including the United States, must also make this pledge. The continued reluctance of the U.S. to make such a declaration can only fuel suspicions that it finds nuclear weapons necessary for preemptive nuclear attacks, despite the availability of vast stocks of sophisticated conventional weapons. It is illogical to pursue nonproliferation agenda and yet "jilt" at the notion of "no first use."

5. Nonproliferation Treaty: The signing of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) goes hand-in-hand with any substantive measures to reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons. It is obvious that India and Pakistan are beyond the point of pledging to not pursue a nuclear weapon capability. But this should not preclude us from pursuing some commitments from South Asia

which would limit any further expansion. India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons, and to not acknowledge their presence is irrational. Supporting the NPT would also serve to bring the South Asian programs, however sophisticated, under the purview and oversight of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA as a "third party observer" would also ensure compliance with the guidelines of the NPT.

Short Term Incentives.

For any of the short term goals and concepts to be realized there must be some advantage for India and Pakistan, and to an even greater extent China, to agree to them. However, if the short term goals are realized then the results would be incentive enough. The overall outcome of these goals should be to stabilize the regions nuclear status quo, prevent nuclear accidents, preclude the unauthorized use nuclear material, and to deny the illegitimate transfer of nuclear technology. The overall outcome would be a safer, more stable, region. If the goals are achieved there will be fewer nuclear arms in South Asia, those there will be known, as will the circumstances under which their deployment might occur.

The safeguards and control mechanisms provided as a result of signing the NPT and the CTBT will ensure that nuclear arms and material are handled, stored, and maintained securely and appropriately. The advantages of becoming a NWS is that it provides a means to improve nuclear safety, which includes the security at facilities, including storage and transportation. Any program which can help to prevent the potential for fissile material falling into the hands of terrorists must be welcomed.

Additional incentives in the form of security assistance should also be pursued. The first step would be the repeal of the Pressler Amendment which would find itself outdated and overcome by a change in policy...a common pursuit of nonproliferation. Security assistance in the form of military sales would not alter the balance of power in the region, however, it would provide Pakistan with the ability to maintain their current level of military sophistication. Pakistan lacks the resources to win an arms race with India, however, to maintain a stable and capable U.S. equipped Muslim nation in the region is in the best interest of the United States. This same type of assistance could be provided to India. Although historically a Soviet weapons state, a slow transformation to Western military hardware would be beneficial to all parties. It might also be viewed as an Indo-Pak CBM!

Long Term Goals.

There must be a basic assumption that the short range goals and concepts have been successful in order to discuss long term goals. Once the conditions for a secure South Asia are established there must be a commitment for further reductions and the elimination of nuclear weapons in South Asia. This cannot be achieved without an equivalent commitment from the other NWS to pursue a policy which would eventually result in the total abolishment of nuclear weapons. We must also ensure that nuclear safeguards are institutionalized to prevent the transfer of technology to rogue nations and terrorist groups.

The advantages of such a policy are clear, if the abolishment is total. However, the discussion of the world's ability to step back from the nuclear weapon threshold is lengthy and complicated. Perhaps there will come a time when the use of nuclear weapons will become

obsolete due to detection and defensive capabilities, the invention of more effective weapons, or the acceptance of non-lethal weapons to achieve a desired end-state. However, the best solution is a long term goal which will support the abolishment of all nuclear weapons, which will only be achieved by a clear consensus of all nations and a strong verification policy. Any violation of which would result in worldwide condemnation, isolation, and economic sanctions to the violating country.

Long Term Incentives.

Both India and Pakistan feel that there is a serious threat to their sovereignty and national security. The long term stabilization of South Asia will require that these two basic concerns be addressed and resolved. This will require the affirmation of the security of South Asia with security assistance policies, and a commitment to assist them in achieving a more internationally oriented free and open market.

The reality of a nuclear weapon free world would seem to be incentive enough to pursue a policy to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons. But the reality is that the elimination of nuclear weapons will not into itself make the world safe. However, if the type of dialogue required to achieve a nuclear disarmament can be achieved, then we will have paved the way for similar dialogue for the resolution of future conflicts. Additionally, should these goals and incentives be achieved, the necessity for conventional arms engagements as a choice for conflict resolution may eventually dissipate

1. Security Assurance: In United Nations parlance there are "negative security assurances;" an assurance from a NWS that they will not abuse their nuclear strength, and "positive security assurances;" a promise to come to the assistance of a NNWS should they be threatened by nuclear attack.²² If we can accomplish our short term goals then the potential for nuclear aggression may be greatly diminished, but not conventional arms aggression. Therefore, whether nuclear or conventional, we must assure all NNWS, and specifically, India and Pakistan, that the United States would counter any threat to their nation. Additionally, we can contribute to a policy of "transparency" in the region by facilitating military to military exercises with India and Pakistan.

This guarantee would be of great relevance to inhibit the nuclear aspirations of weaker

States in adversarial situations to seek nuclear weapons as a counter poise for use in a 'defensive deterrent' role.²³ Additionally, the U.S. should pledge in an unqualified and universal manner that it would not use it's nuclear weapons against NNWS.²⁴ This would further strengthen world beliefs that nuclear weapons are not political instruments but only serve the ends of deterrence.²⁵

2. Economic Assistance: In addition to defense related issues, the United States must engage South Asia economically. There is a new economic elite emerging that is outward-looking and more concerned with profit and competitiveness than with India's abilities to wield political and military influence.²⁶ This move towards a more free-market economy must be used as an opportunity for the Western nations and the United States to increase the level of economic interaction with South Asia. This "engagement" would likely have a positive effect on South

Asia's importance to the world economy and would also displace the notion that "nuclear weapons" somehow increases their stature in the international community.

India and Pakistan have important growing market economies--important to the United States.²⁷ By encouraging investments, both U.S. and foreign, the U.S. can further engage the South Asian economy. Economic growth would help strengthen India's and Pakistan's influence and leverage in the international community. This type of economic growth might eventually allow India and Pakistan to affect global issues without feeling the need for nuclear weapons as leverage. This is especially true of India, where the pursuit of the nuclear weapon capabilities has been closely linked with their need to be recognized as a world power.

While trade has increased in recent years between Pakistan, India, and China, the volumes are still low given the size of their respective economies.²⁸ To encourage and facilitate economic vitality would lead to a stronger economic link between India and Pakistan and serve to further strengthen their national ties. Additionally, this type of economic policy is consistent with the current U.S. policy towards China. To include India and Pakistan will strengthen economic stability of the region.

Conclusion.

I have proposed some fairly comprehensive short and long term objectives. Arguably they may be ideallistic, they are nevertheless, feasible. The implementation of these preventive strategies will require a wide range of diplomatic negotiations with a number of nations, including China, Russia, Japan, and the other NWSs. Their ability to reinforce the nonproliferation strategy for South Asia is vital. Of equal importance, the U.S. must revive the dialogue on proliferation

issues with both countries, not in Geneva or Vienna, but in South Asia.²⁹ For any of the strategies to succeed it is imperative that the U.S. recognize the issue of sovereignty and the rights that go with it. These are deeply rooted and sensitive views shared by India and Pakistan. India's long-standing nuclear paradigm must be abandoned, in whole or in part, and replaced with something else. World opinion is against India, and only made worse by the fact that Pakistan has supported the CTBT. However, all countries should commit themselves to nuclear disarmament and a timetable for achieving it.

India has been given the ultimate power to obstruct the CTBT. A power that it presently seems determined to exercise. In so doing, India has put itself in the extraordinary position of exercising a unilateral veto over the arms control measure that it has historically cherished above all others. The CTBT is a good, albeit, not final solution to the nuclear arms race. However, India's determination not to ratify the CTBT, is confusing in that it appears to run counter to Indian philosophy. This apparent dichotomy is further complicated by the popular support of this position within India and the political suicide which would befall any Indian leader who chose to follow a path of nonproliferation.

In an era in which India is attempting to expand its economic influence, they are placing themselves in a very unpopular position in the eyes of the other nations of the world. Their position is further weakened by the fact that Pakistan and China have both signed the CTBT. The Indian people must decide the South Asia that they choose to live in, a nuclear free sub-continent or one in which nuclear ambiguity reigns. Nonetheless, a foundation does exist upon which future initiatives could be built to promote regional cooperation and stability.³¹

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